I.1 Introduction
Over the last 50 years the rate of union membership declined, as did the incidence of strike activity. Similarly analyses of union activity, particularly strikes, are now occupying a smaller proportion of the economics and industrial relations literature (Godard, 2011 and Brym, Bauer and McIvor, 2013) . Nevertheless, there still remain a number of unanswered questions. Explaining these is important because the same theory which explains firm-worker relations can be used to understand other type of negotiation interactions and outcomes.
Although couched in terms of strike incidence, this paper's results are equally applicable to other bargaining and potential conflict situations, such as domestic conflict (e.g. household divorce) or international relations (e.g. the decision a country faces to impose trade restrictions or even go to war).
In this paper, we revisit the "joint costs" theory of strikes by linking elements of this model with imperfect information and union/firm misperceptions. Our purpose is to reconcile the model's failure to explain a number of empirical observations on strikes and to correctly account for certain "stylized facts" in strike literature. In so doing, we show how higher worker or firm strike costs need not always lead to fewer strikes, as the joint cost model predicts. Instead, under certain conditions, raising joint strike costs can actually yield higher, rather than lower, strike incidence. What drives the result is asymmetrically increasing strike costs, a consideration not explored in depictions of the joint-strike model (e.g. Sopher, 1990 ).
I.2 Literature Review
A voluminous literature has appeared in the past 50 years on strikes and their possible explanations. Figuring prominently in the strike literature canon, the "joint costs" model (Reder and Neumann, 1980 and Kennan, 1980a) is an intuitively attractive model deriving from basic economic principles that lead to straightforward predictions which can be easily tested: it argues that the incentive to strike is inversely related to the total costs associated with both a union's and a firm's strike activities. Variables that increase either party's strike costs decrease strike activity, ceteris paribus; while the reverse holds for factors decreasing strike costs. Kennan suggests that "this approach yields useful empirical predictions, which may be summarized by the statement that the probability of settling a strike … depends on the total cost of the strike to both parties." Hence, "for the trade union, increasing either the strike fund, the availability (or level) of unemployment insurance, or the opportunity of finding employment elsewhere will increase the likelihood of a strike. For the employer, increasing inventory … will lower the cost of a strike for the firm, thereby strengthening the firm's resistance to worker claims and the length of strikes."
The "joint costs" model has been tested empirically with mixed results. Reder and Neumann (1980) use inventory variations, shipment variations, and value added per worker to represent aspects of strike costs. First, they posit that joint strike costs vary inversely with the intra-industry variation in finished goods inventory (because intra-industry inventory variations proxy a firm's ability for pre-and post-strike substitution in production). Second, they posit that joint strike costs vary directly with overall shipment variations (because a smooth delivery rate decreases a firm's production and delivery costs). Third, they posit that joint strike costs vary directly with the relative wage, as denoted by the relative value added per worker. Based on these three assertions, they predict that strikes vary directly with the variation in inventories, inversely with the variation in shipments, and inversely with the relative value added per worker.
Employing U.S. manufacturing data during 1953-73, Reder and Neumann find strike activity to be inversely related to shipment variability and relative wages (with the results for the former not always statistically significant), and strike activity to be directly related to inventory variability, as predicted. However, using Canadian manufacturing data for 1962 -1982 , Cousineau and Lacroix (1986 are unable to find a significant relationship between strike probability and joint strike costs (as proxied by the coefficient of variation of the ratio of inventories to sales). Whereas, Kennan (1980b) found some empirical support that strike duration is directly related to unemployment insurance benefits (which would decrease strike costs), other attempts to test the theory's predictions produced mixed results. Using Canadian manufacturing data and employing output losses to proxy joint strike costs, Maki (1986) found only weak evidence of the hypothesized inverse relationship between strikes and output loss. Also with Canadian manufacturing data, Ahmed (1989) finds no statistical evidence to support the theoretical prediction of an inverse correlation between output loss and strikes. Employing a laboratory experimental approach, Sopher (1990) finds "moderate" support for the joint-cost theory. Using higher levels of unemployment to proxy higher worker strike costs, Ingram, Metcalf and Wadsworth (1993) find British strikes to be more likely the higher the unemployment, again contrary to expectations. On the other hand, Crampton and Tracy (1994) find that U.S. strike incidence increases with lower levels of unemployment and lower real wages. Burlow and Buckley (1998) offer empirical support for the joint costs model using Irish firm-level data, as does Nicolitsas (2000) using British data.
Finally, Geraghty and Wiseman (2008) find evidence that "…variables that decrease a side's cost of striking or increase its opponent's cost are shown to increase its maximum holdout time, and vice versa, and strike duration increases with the value of the prize in dispute…"
In addition to the above mixed success of the "joint costs" model, the theory is problematic in explaining the most important "stylized fact" in the strike literature, namely the empirical regularity of cyclical strike incidence (Rees, 1952 , O'Brien, 1965 , Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969 , Gunderson, Kervin and Reed, 1986 , Vroman, 1989 , Dickerson, 1994 , and Huberman, 2002 . As Hirsch and Addison (1986, p. 104) observe "indeed, joint strike costs seem likely to increase with the level of economic activity, leading to the incorrect prediction of counter-cyclical strike activity (incidence)."
1 Even on this topic, however, there was some evidence in Canada in 2009 that strike incidence was higher during a deep recession (Owram, 2009) , supporting a counter-cyclical prediction.
Finally, the two main manifestations of strike activity, incidence and duration, do not seem to respond in the same way to a number of economic variables like the bargaining unit size and the business cycle (Gunderson and Melino, 1990 , Harrison and Stewart, 1993 , and Campolieti, Hebdon, and Hyatt, 2005 . With regards to bargaining unit size for example, Campolieti, Hebdon and Hyatt, 2005 , find that "…smaller bargaining units were less likely to strike that were larger bargaining units, but had longer strikes when they did strike." In addition, Brym, Bauer and McIvor, 2013 , report that while "…some research also suggests that strike duration is counter-cyclical…after 2001, mean strike duration increased and was not counter-cyclical".
I.3 Model Outline and Predictions
We build as simple a model as we can, to illustrate why the "joint costs" theory could yield ambiguous results with respect to one manifestation of strike activity, namely strike incidence. As a by-product, we show why some strikes may be perfectly rational thus providing an explanation for what Kennan (1986) calls the "Hicks Paradox". Our approach begins with standard Hicksian concession curves modified by Mauro (1982) to account for imperfect information. From these curves a payoff matrix is derived under alternative union and firm strategies. The resulting payoff matrix implies contract negotiations to follow along the lines of a "game of chicken". 2 A strike occurs when both unions and firms "hold out".
The solution to this game indicates no one pure Nash-equilibrium strategy. Instead each player must adopt a mixed strategy so that choices become probabilistic depending on the payoff matrices, which depend on union and firm concession curve parameters. This mixed strategy implies that each player occasionally holds out. Holding out is perfectly rational and consistent with Hicks' (1963) assertion that "a union which never strikes may lose its ability to organize a formidable strike (p. 146)". In addition, the results indicate that each party's strike costs (reflected in rates of concession) have an ambiguous effect on strike incidence.
What drive the results are asymmetric changes in relative costs. For example, as union strike costs rise, the union holdout probability falls. But if unions hold out less (i.e., concede more), the firm's expected profit from conceding decreases (because by conceding firms have to pay higher wages). Lower expected profits from conceding causes the firm to hold out more. In turn, holding out more potentially increases strike incidence. Whether strikes actually increase depend on both union and firm hold out probabilities. We show that under plausible circumstances the firm's hold out probability increases more quickly than the union's hold out probability diminishes, which can lead to a greater strike incidence. Thus this asymmetric rise in employee-employer strike costs implies that strike probabilities can rise. (The same holds when firm costs rise more quickly than union costs.) Therefore higher strike costs need not lead to fewer strikes. As such, the approach may account for the mixed success of the "joint costs" theory of strikes in explaining strike incidence.
II.1 The Game
According to Hicks 3 , if strikes were costly, both a firm and its workers would pay to renegotiate a contract rather than strike. Workers pay by consenting to accept a wage lower than desired. Firms pay by offering a wage higher than anticipated. Since costs are proportional to strike duration, avoiding longer strikes implies greater union and firm conditions, in the same way they are affected by product market conditions, where loss of output affects both the firm's and workers' net income by reducing the absolute share of the pie available to them. Let Wu be the wage a union would accept now to avoid a strike of expected duration su.
Then:
where Wr is the union's reservation wage (i.e., the wage that the union will accept now in order to avoid a strike of zero expected duration). In essence this wage reflects union "demands" and is determined by what it conceives to be workers' value. The slope, b, of the resistance curve reflects the union's cost of extending the strike one time-period. The greater the strike costs, the more wages the union would be willing to give up to avoid a strike, and hence the greater the magnitude of b.
Let Wf be the wage a firm would offer now to avoid a strike of expected duration Sf.
where W0 is the maximum wage that the firm would offer now in order to avoid a strike of zero expected duration, and c is the slope of Wf which reflects the firm's costs of prolonging a strike one additional time period.
Setting su = sf and solving for W * , one obtains
7 which is the wage that the union would accept and the firm would offer now, if they both expected a strike of length S* as in Figure 1 . Note that if b = c, i.e. if the concession curves have equal slopes, then
which is the special case when the two parties "split the difference".
Hicks (1963, p. 146) argues that incomplete or asymmetric information can make W * initially unattainable, thereby leading to a strike. 4 This can be illustrated easily. As in Mauro (1982) , suppose the firm underestimates the minimum union asking wage and overestimates union strike costs. Such misperceptions lead the firm to offer a wage unacceptable to the union. Graphically, this implies that the firm perceives the union resistance curve to be lower and steeper (e.g. Wu p ) than it really is. This leads the firm to offer a wage no higher than W0 * , the intersection of its perceived union resistance and its own actual concession curve, thinking it acceptable to the union ( Figure 1 ). Algebraically, the firm's perceived union resistance curve Wu p can be written as
The degree to which  1 < Wr reflects the firm's misperception of union reservation wages.
The degree to which  2 > b reflects the firm's overestimate of union strike costs.
Similarly the union would accept a wage no lower than Wr * (the intersection of perceived firm concession and its own actual resistance curve) if it wrongly perceives the firm concession curve to be higher and steeper (e.g. Wf p ) than it is. Algebraically, the union's perceived firm concession curve (Wf p ) can be depicted as In the game, each player-participant has a choice: concede to the other party's offer (demand) or hold out. If the union concedes while the firm holds out, the union obtains a wage W0 * for its workers, the highest wage the firm is willing to offer given its expectations about the union's resistance curve. If the firm concedes while the union holds out, the union obtains Wr * , which is the lowest wage that the union would accept given its expectations about the firm's concession curve. When both sides concede, it is reasonable to assume a wage in-between, e.g.
such that f /W0 * > 0, f / Wr * > 0, f / b < 0, f / c > 0. However, when both sides cooperate by conceding, they in effect exchange truthful information about each other's concession/resistance curves, which as Hicks observed yields the original settlement obtained by equating Wu and Wf depicted by equation (3). Lastly, when both sides hold out, a strike results yielding a zero wage.
II.2 The Payoff Matrix
Payoffs for the two parties are recorded in Table 1 . Union payoffs are denoted as Uij, where i depicts the union's action (concede or hold out) and j the firm's. Thus Ucc is the union's payoff when both the union and the firm concede; Uhc, the union payoff when the union holds out and the firm concedes; Uch, the union's payoff when the union concedes and the firm holds out; and Uhh, the union's payoff when both parties hold out. curve and the union a lower than true firm concession curve) would lead to an atypical "impasse". The union would demand a lower wage than the firm would be willing to offer and we cannot see why they should not settle without a strike.
We assume union objectives are identified with those of the median union voter, an assumption for which there is ample precedent (e.g. see Hirsch and Addison, 1986, p. 28 ) and empirical support (e.g. Kaufman and Martinez-Vasquez, 1988, 1990) .
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To satisfy the "median" union voter we assume these demands will mostly concern the wage. A firm's employee-termination (firing) policy which is inversely related to seniority (i.e. a "first-inlast-out" policy) would in general not harm the median voter since he or she will not be under immediate threat of losing his or her job. 8 Unless the median voter is altruistic and concerned about employment of low seniority fellow workers, this assumption enables us to rid ourselves of concern for employment levels in the union objective function, and thus to specify union returns as the median voter's wage under given contingencies. 9 Further the assumption is reasonable given our objective to find plausible circumstances under which increases in joint strike costs might fail to reduce the probability of a strike. ) so that ch  cc  hc. Clearly a strike yields no production and hence lower profits or even losses, which we simply denote as zero profits. Thus one would expect ch  cc  hc > hh.
6 Again, we do not wish to give reasons justifying incomplete information, but merely fall back on an ample supply of past and current work supporting this contention. Our point isn't to justify existing models, but to show how strikes can rationally occur in the context of such models and how in this framework higher joint strike costs need not always lead to fewer strikes. outcome is more likely, will lead us to an explanation of strike incidence the first time the game is played. If no strike results, the game is not played again until a new contract is up for re-negotiation. If, however, a strike results the game is repeated. The duration of the strike will depend on how many H-H solutions one gets as the game is repeated (with adjusted payoffs) during the course of the strike. In this paper we concentrate on strike incidence and one-shot game results and defer the implications of the repeated game for a future research topic.
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III.1 Implications and Derivations of Optimal Strategies
After examining both parties' possible options from the previous matrix, we find no dominant strategy. From the point of view of the firm, it is best to hold out (ch  cc) if the union concedes, while it is best to concede (hc  0) if the union holds out. From the point of view of the union, it is best to hold out (Uhc  Ucc) if the firm concedes, while it is best to concede (Uch  0) if the firm holds out. This leads to two possible pure Nash equilibria, the first being concede-hold out (C-H) and the second being hold out-concede (H-C), and a mixed Nash equilibrium strategy where each side chooses either to concede or hold out with an optimally determined probability.
It is easy to show that the other two pure strategies, i.e. concede-concede (C-C) and hold out-hold out (H-H) are not stable. If both sides concede and settle at W*, an agreement is reached without a strike. This solution, however, is not stable since each party has an incentive to "cheat" by holding out. However, a double hold out strategy spells trouble for both, since a strike occurs and both lose. A strike is a no-trade outcome that shrinks the absolute value of the "pie" to be divided. As a result, this double hold out solution is also unstable. Strikes are indeed a rare phenomenon 11 and some kind of mutual compromise seems to result from most contract negotiations. This would correspond to our concede-concede solution, which although unstable since one side could gain by holding out hoping that its 9 In direct evidence on union preferences, Clark and Oswald (1988) find that for the U.K. in the late 1980's union leaders prefer to bargain over wage than over employment levels. 10 See Kuhn and Gu (1998, 1999) for a model where learning through sequential bargaining plays an important role in strike and wage outcomes. A similar approach is followed by Calabuig and Olcina (2000), in an infinite horizon repeated game model with incomplete information, where strikes are the result of building a reputation for toughness by each side, and strike incidence is shown to be positively related to firm profitability and negatively related to firm and union strike costs. rival will concede, is often observed because of the threat that the other party will also hold out thus bringing pain to both.
The payoff matrix in Table 1 is consistent with the "game of chicken": all entries are Pareto superior to the hold out-hold out (strike) outcome, but because concede-hold out dominates concede-concede for the firm, and hold out-concede dominates concede-concede for the union, it is in each party's best interest to threaten to take a hold out strategy, hoping that its rival will be scared into conceding. Thus as in the "game of chicken" each party has an incentive to display "toughness" even if each party has no intentions of holding out all the way. To display this "toughness" each side adopts a mixed strategy by choosing to hold out with a probability determined by each side maximizing its expected payoff.
III.2 Derivation of the Firm's and Union's Optimal Strategies
The risk-neutral union maximizes its expected utility by maximizing its expected payoff.
If the union concedes, the expected wage will be:
where Pf is the probability that the firm will concede, W0 where Wr * = ( 2Wr + b 1) / (b +  2). Then, the union will maximize its expected payoff U:
where Pu is the probability that the union will concede.
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, Pu can assume values ranging from 0 to 1, while Pu can be either 0 or 1 if only pure strategies are allowed. To maximize U one derives the following first order condition by differentiating it with respect to the choice variable Pu:
which expression which does not have Pu as an argument. This implies that an interior solution (i.e. 0 < Pu < 1) for the union depends on the firm's strategy. Only when Pf is such that the equation is zero is union utility maximized. Otherwise it is optimal for the union to revert to a pure strategy. Solving for the optimal value of Pf, Pf * , we then get:
implying that in equilibrium the firm will choose to concede exactly Pf * percent of the time. If the firm chose to concede more than Pf * percent of the time, the union's expected wage from conceding would be less than the union's expected wage from holding out (i.e. Wc < Wh or Wc -Wh > 0), and hence the union will always choose to hold out; if the firm chose to concede less than Pf * percent of the time, the union's expected wage from conceding would exceed the union's expected wage from holding out (i.e. Wc > Wh, or Wc -Wh > 0), and hence the union will never choose to hold out. Therefore, in a mixed strategy equilibrium, the firm must choose to concede exactly Pf * percent of the time, or equivalently the firm must Holding the union's strike costs b constant, higher firm costs c have an unambiguous negative effect on the firm's hold out probability. However, holding firm costs c constant, higher union costs b have an ambiguous effect on the firm's hold out probability. Higher union strike costs can increase the firm's probability of holding out when initial union strike costs are low. However, as the union's strike costs increase, after a point the probability of the firm holding out decreases. As such, initially higher union costs decrease the return to conceding now and can lead to a higher likelihood of holding out! This result may muddle the "joint costs" model's straightforward predictions, as it suggests that higher costs do not necessarily lead to a reduced hold out probability. As we will see later when we investigate joint firm-union behavior, this result opens the door to the possibility that higher strike costs may not always reduce strike probability. 13 At this point we cannot make a definitive statement as to how joint strike costs may affect the strike probability since we haven't yet investigated the union's strategy. We need to investigate the union hold out probability since a strike is a joint hold out outcome. We derive the union's hold out probability by looking at the firm's profit maximizing behavior, to which we now turn.
Assume the firm maximizes expected profits . If the firm concedes, expected profits will be:
If the firm holds out, its expected profits will be:
12 One might argue that union and firm perceptions of each others' costs (Wu p and Wf p ) change as actual costs b and c increase. However, increasing cost perceptions as one augments actual costs reinforces our conclusions regarding the ambiguity of the joint costs model. 13 Sections III.3 below illustrates this ambiguity using a simple graphical approach.
Then the firm maximizes expected profits :
To maximize the above function, one must derive the first order condition:
and solve for the optimal Pu, Pu * . We get:
Hence, in a mixed strategy equilibrium, the union must choose to concede exactly Pu * percent of the time, or equivalently it must choose to hold out exactly (1 -Pu * ) = (ch -cc)/(hc -ch -cc) percent of the time.
To get the effects of b and c on (1 -Pu * ) and hence on the union's likelihood of holding out, we differentiate (1 -Pu * ) with respect to each of these variables (see Appendix 1). We get:
Hence, higher union costs b, holding firm costs c constant have an unambiguous negative effect on the union's probability of holding out. However, higher firm strike costs c, holding union costs b constant have an ambiguous effect on the union's likelihood of holding out. At low cost levels, higher costs increase the hold out probability, but at higher cost levels, the effect on holding out becomes negative. It is that ambiguous result that may lead to a lower strike probability as strike costs c increase.
III.3 Joint Union/Firm Equilibrium Strike Behavior
We can now attempt to combine optimal behavior for both sides. A strike results only when both sides hold out. Hence, the probability of a strike should be given by the product of each side's hold out probabilities so that P(strike) = P(firm hold out)* P(union hold out) = (1 -Pf Some implications arise directly from the above equation for strike probability. First, we can verify that the strike probability will be zero if either party has perfect information. For example, when the firm has no misperceptions regarding the union's resistance curve (i.e. (1 -Pu * ) = 0 and also that P(strike) = 0. So, when either union strike costs b or firm strike costs c are zero (or both) there is no possibility of a strike because at least one side will never hold out.
The joint costs theory of strikes predicts how the strike probability changes when union strike costs b and/or firm strike costs c rise. Actually it would predict that any factor raising joint strike costs decreases strike probability. We now show that higher strike costs need not always lead to a lower strike probability.
First let us look at how higher union costs b affect strike probability, holding firm costs c constant. To do that we differentiate the strike probability [(1 -Pf * ) (1 -Pu * )] with respect to b. Appendix 2 presents the derivation of this partial differentiation where we obtain the following:
This result indicates that holding firm costs c constant, higher union strike costs b, have an ambiguous effect on strike probability.
Perhaps a graphical approach is warranted to best illustrate this ambiguous effect of a rise in union strike costs b. In figure 2, Wu and Wf are resistance and concession curves already defined and illustrated in figure 1. They denote the wages the union and firm would accept now to avoid a strike of expected duration s. The difference here compared to figure 1 is that numerous Wu curves are drawn to illustrate the effect of altering the union's strike cost parameter, b. For example, b = 0 reflects zero union strike costs and hence a horizontal Wu(b0) curve, implying that the union would concede nothing to avoid a strike. , the firm concedes with probability 1, or it holds out with probability 0, as we showed previously. As union strike costs b increase, Wf(bi) rotates downwards. The difference (Wr * -W * ) initially increases, hence increasing the firm's concede probability, or increasing its hold out probability. Eventually, however, the difference between Wr * and W * begins to decline, thereby decreasing the firm's hold out probability.
Since a strike is a joint hold out outcome, we cannot predict the effect on strike probability until we analyze how higher union costs b affect the union's hold out probability as well.
Recall from equation (17) that the union's concede probability is related to firm profits.
Clearly profits are inversely related to wages; the more the firm pays the lower are profits, neglecting efficiency wage arguments which probably don't apply here anyway. Thus, profits can be expressed as (w) = 1/(w); for simplicity let  = 1. This implies that Pu , and therefore the probability of the union holding out falls.
As union strike costs b rise, the union becomes less likely to hold out, but the firm initially becomes more likely to hold out, starting with a hold out (and hence a strike) probability of zero. Therefore, since initially zero, strike probability can only rise as union strike costs increase; and it may continue to do so as long as the percentage increase in the firm hold out probability exceeds the percentage decline in the union hold out probability. Eventually, as both sides' hold out probabilities decrease with higher union strike costs b, strike probability necessarily declines. These patterns are illustrated in figure 5 which will be explained later.
Next, let's examine the impact of increasing firm strike costs c, holding union strike costs b constant. To do that we differentiate the strike probability [(1 -Pf * )(1 -Pu * )] with respect to c. Appendix 2 presents the derivation of this partial differentiation where we obtain the following:
Raising firm strike costs c ambiguously affects the strike probability holding constant union strike costs b. Let us again employ a simple graphical approach to illustrate this possible ambiguity. In figure 3 all curves are as already defined. However, instead of assessing the impact of the union's resistance curve rotating downward, we now consider the impact of the firm's concession curve rotating upward. Again purely for illustration make the assumption Eventually, however, the difference between W * and W0 * begins to decline thereby decreasing the union's hold out probability.
Hence, as firm strike costs c rise, the firm becomes less likely to hold out, but the union initially becomes more likely to hold out, starting with a hold out (and hence a strike) probability of zero. So the strike probability can only rise at first and it may continue to do so as long as the percentage increase in the union's hold out probability exceeds the percentage decrease in the firm hold out probability. Eventually, however, as both sides' hold out probabilities decline with higher firm strike costs c, the strike probability necessarily decreases.
Concession curve estimates are not common, so it is difficult to guess parameters of the relevant curves like Wr * and W0 * . Nevertheless, given our concern only with illustrating that the joint costs model need not hold, we merely take reasonable parameter values (based in part on Farber (1978) and Siebert, Bertrand, and Addison (1985) ) and try to simulate strike probabilities. These simulations are presented in Table 2 and in figures 4 and 5 and confirm our models' predictions. Two examples are given: one in which union strike costs b increase, holding constant firm strike costs (left panel of Table 2 and figure 4); and one in which firm strike costs c increase, holding constant union strike costs (right panel of Table 2 and figure   5 ). Presented are firm and union hold out probabilities (1 -Pf * ) and (1 -Pu * ), as well as the strike probability P(str). As we increase union strike costs b, the union's hold out probability continually declines. On the other hand, higher values for b first increase then decrease the firm's hold out probability. The joint effect is that strike probability first increases (up to 4%) then decreases. Similarly, as we increase firm strike costs c, the firm's hold out probability continually declines. However, higher values for c first increase then decrease the union's hold out probability. The joint effect as firm strike costs c increase is that strike probability first rises (up to 5%) then declines. It is interesting to note that the British strike probability is between 0.8 and 4.9% (Ingram, Metcalf, and Wadsworth 1993) , though at least in the past somewhat higher in the U.S. (Gramm, 1987) .
IV. Concluding Remarks
Motivated by the mixed success of the joint costs model of strike activity, we analyzed union-firm bargaining behavior in the context of Hicksian concession curves. We found both unions and firms to fare best when both concede. They fare worst when both hold out. The union does best when it holds out and when the firm concedes. Firms do best when they hold out while the union concedes. This reward structure yields a payoff matrix comparable to the game of chicken. In "chicken", no single pure Nash equilibrium solution emerges. Instead, there exist two pure Nash equilibria and a mixed Nash equilibrium. The perfectly rational firm and perfectly rational union follow a mixed strategy so that they hold out occasionally to preserve credibility, even if both sides could see a better deal by jointly conceding. Hence, the union or the firm may choose to hold out even if the expected payoff from holding out or conceding in a mixed-strategy equilibrium is less than the payoff when both concede. This result is consistent with Hicks (1963) , who reached the conclusion that "the trade union leadership will embark on strikes occasionally, not so much to secure greater gains upon that occasion (which are not very likely to result) but in order to keep the weapon burnished…(p. The results show that increasing strike costs in an asymmetric way can have ambiguous effects on strike probability. Increasing one side's strike costs decreases its incentive to strike. However, in response, the other side's incentive can increase, since under many circumstances it bargains harder to collect relatively larger expected rents. As such, the probability of a strike can rise even as joint strike costs increase. This result may account for the mixed success the joint cost strike model has in explaining strike activity. Although couched in terms of strike incidence, the results are equally applicable to other bargaining venues such as household divorce or the decision a country faces to go to war.
APPENDIX 1
In this Appendix we derive the signs for (1 -Pf < 0, which implies that as firm strike costs increase, the firm's probability of holding out declines unambiguously.
Turning to the union, we can find how the union's hold out probability changes as union strike costs b and firm strike costs c change. Recall that the union's probability of conceding .35
